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EXCEPTIONS TO THE DEAD MAN'S ACT
Section 2 of the Evidence and Depositions Act (commonly known as
the Dead Man's Act), which seals the lips of a party or interested person'
when he is suing or defending against a party who is protected under the
Act,2 is subject to certain exceptions. The exceptions to the Dead Man's Act
include a proviso in the first paragraph of the Act and five separately enum-
erated exceptions.
CALLING BY THE ADVERSE PARTY
The first paragraph of the Dead Man's Act provides "No party . . .
or person directly interested.. . shall be allowed to testify therein of his own
motion, or in his own behalf . . . when the adverse party sues or defends
(in one of the enumerated protected capacities) ... unless when called as a
witness by such adverse party. ... "3
When a person who is protected by the Dead Man's Act calls as his
witness a person who is disqualified from testifying by the Act the disqualifi-
cation of that person is removed. Prior to 1934, a protected party would call
the disqualified witness under Section 6 of the Evidence and Depositions
Act 4 and the witness became a witness of the calling party in the same man-
ner and subject to the same rules as other witnesses called by him. In other
words, the person called under Section 6 of the Evidence and Depositions
Act had to be examined by the use of the direct question; leading questions
were not permitted. Since 1934 the calling of a disqualified witness is pro-
vided for under Section 60 of the Civil Practice Act.5 Section 60 of the
Civil Practice Act differs from former Section 6 of the Evidence and Deposi-
tions Act in that no longer is the witness examined in the same manner as
other witnesses. Under Section 60 the witness may be examined by the use
of leading questions, as though he were being cross-examined.
The calling party of the otherwise incompetent witness by the pro-
tected party opens the door to the attorney for the opposing party to
examine the witness at the close of the primary examination.6 However,
the extent to which the witness may be examined by the attorney for the
adverse party is within the discretion of the court;7 but the examina-
tion must remain within the bounds of the matter upon which he has al-
I See discussion of "parties" and "interested parties" at page 40 of this symposium.
2 See discussion of "protected parties" at page 49 of this symposium.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 2 (1967) (emph. added).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 6 (1933), repealed by Act approved June 23, 1933, L.1933, p.
785, effective Jan. 1, 1934.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 60 (1967).
6 Combs v. Younge, 281 Ill. App. 339 (2d Dist. 1935); Bertolet v. Stoner, 164 Ill. App.
605 (2d Dist. 1911); Harnish v. Miles, 111 IlL. App. 106 (2d Dist. 1903).
7 Combs v. Younge, supra note 6.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ready been examined and must not be an interjection of his own case at this
stage of the proceedings. 8
The calling of a party9 or an interested persono by a protected party
under the Dead Man's Act opens the door for the opposing party and re-
moves the disqualification, to a limited degree, of the witness who was called
by the protected party. Thus, the calling of an otherwise incompetent witness
renders the witness competent to testify for the opposing party on that
party's own motion and in his behalf during his presentation of the case.1'
However, the witness is not made competent to testify generally to all
matters for the opposing party.12 The extent and limitation to which the
otherwise incompetent witness is rendered competent is only to those
matters on which he was examined by the protected party. 13 Thus, in
Perkins v. Brown,'4 an action was brought by heirs to set aside a deed given
to the defendant. The heirs (protected parties) had called the defendant
under Section 60 of the Civil Practice Act and examined him as to when he
received the deed, from whom he received it, by whom, when and where the
deed was signed. They also elicited from him that he did not give con-
sideration for the deed. In the defendant's presentation of the case he testi-
fied to the entire transaction, including conversations with the decedent
concerning the conveyance of the property. The protected party objected to
this testimony. The trial court overruled the objection and allowed into
evidence his testimony as to the whole transaction surrounding the giving of
the deed. In affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court said:
The rule is that where a party, who is incompetent to testify for
himself as to a transaction, is called by the adverse party [protected
party] and questioned concerning the same, he is thereby made
competent to testify in his own behalf as to the whole of such trans-
action, although his incompetency is not removed as to matters
about which he was not interrogated by the adverse party [pro-
tected party] .... It would be probably unjust if a litigant were
permitted to call an adverse party [disqualified witness] and
examine him as to one fact or phase of a transaction in his favor
and then invoke the bar of the statute when the party examined
sought to testify further with regard to the same transaction for the
8 Grace v. Grace, 270 I1. 558, 110 N.E. 784 (1915); DeYoung v. Halley, 329 Il1. App.
1, 67 N.E.2d 221 (1st Dist. 1946).
9 Perkins v. Brown, 400 Ill. 490, 81 N.E.2d 207 (1949); Duffy v. Duffy, 243 Ill. 476,
90 N.E. 697 (1909).
10 Hoffer v. Custer, 237 Ill. 476, 86 N.E. 737 (1908); Bertolet v. Stoner, supra note 6.
11 Perkins v. Brown, supra note 9; Chabot v. Kelly, 72 Ill. App. 2d 150, 218 N.E.2d
207 (Ist Dist. 1966); Combs v. Younge, supra note 6; Harnish v. Miles, supra note 6.
12 Perkins v. Brown, supra note 9; Grace v. Grace. supra note 8; Merchants' Loan
and Trust Co. v. Egan, 22 Ill. 494, 78 N.E. 800 (1906); Chalkowski v. Szafronski, 250 Ill.
App. 359 (1st Dist. 1928).
13 Perkins v. Brown, supra note 9; Washington v. Peterson, 320 111. App. 140, 49
N.E.2d 883 (3d Dist. 1943); In re Estate of Wright, 304 Ill. App. 87, 25 N.E.2d 909 (2d Dist.
1940); Blumb v. Getz, 294 11. App. 434, 13 N.E.2d 1019 (3d Dist. 1938).
14 Supra note 9.
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purpose of explaining his former testimony or correcting an erron-
eous impression left thereby. 15
The taking of a deposition of a party or an interested person by the
protected party prior to trial is not a calling within the meaning of the
statute; 16 however, if the deposition of the disqualified witness is introduced
at the trial, the disqualification is removed to the same extent as it would be
if the witness has been called by the protected party.'7
In order to remove the disqualification of the statute, the calling of the
otherwise incompetent witness by the protected party must be in the same
suit in which the witness is seeking to testify.'s Thus, in Merchants' Loan
and Trust Co. v. Egan,19 an action in trover, the protected party introduced
testimony given by the incompetent witness during a citation to discover
assets proceeding in the Probate Court. The court held that the introduction
of the disqualified witness' testimony taken at the citation proceeding wa,
not a "calling by the adverse party" (protected party) within the meaning
of the statute.
FACTS OCCURRING AFTER THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED
The first separate exception to the Dead Man's Act provides:
In any such action, suit or proceeding, a party or interested person
may testify to facts occurring after the death of such deceased per-
son, or after the ward, heir, legatee of devisee shall have attained
his majority. 20
Under this exception to the Dead Man's Act, when the action is brought
by or against the executor, administrator, heir, legatee or devisee of any
deceased person and the witness otherwise disqualified by the Act attempts
to testify in behalf of the opposing party the question to be answered is
whether or not his testimony is to facts that occurred after the death of the
decedent. The rationale for allowing a witness disqualified by the Dead
Man's Act to testify to facts occurring after the death of the decedent is
that the inequality in availability of proof, which the Act seeks to prevent,
does not exist between the parties as to facts that occur after death.21
A disqualified witness is competent, by the exception, to testify to the
finding of documents among the effects of the decedent. 22 Thus, in Doyle v.
Doyle,2 3 the disqualified party in a will contest was held competent to
15 Id. at 497, 81 N.E.2d at 210-211.
16 Pink v. Dempsey, 350 I1. App. 405, 113 N.E.2d 334 (lst Dist. 1955); Wasserman v.
Darr, 11 FR Serv. 577 (1948).
17 In re Estate of Hershon, 329 111. App. 328, 68 N.E.2d 482 (Ist Dist. 1946).
18 Merchants' Loan and Trust Co. v. Egan, supra note 12.
19 Ibid.
20 Il. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 2, par. 1st (1967).
21 Stone v. Cook, 79 111. 424 (1875).
22 Doyle v. Doyle, 257 I1. 229, 100 N.E. 950 (1913); Griffin v. Griffin, 125 I1. 430, 17
N.E. 782 (1888).
23 Doyle v. Doyle, supra note 22.
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testify to finding among the testatrix's effects a letter written by the plain-
tiff to the testatrix which tended to rebut allegations of misrepresentation
of the plaintiff's character to the testatrix by the defendant. Likewise, the
otherwise incompetent witness has been held competent to testify that he
first discovered a cause of action against the decedent after the death of the
decedent; 24 also he has been held to be competent to testify to conversations
or agreements made among the parties to the law suit after the death of the
decedent.2 5
A disqualified witness, however, remains incompetent to testify to facts
occurring after the death of the decedent when the testimony sought to be
introduced seeks to prove a fact which occurred prior to the death of the
decedent. 26 In Halladay v. Blair,27 an action to establish an inter vivos gift,
the executor put in issue the delivery of the claimed gift and the alleged
donee sought to testify to having the gift in her possession at the time of
and after the alleged donor's death. The court in that case said:
The obvious purpose of eliciting the testimony from the claimant
that she had been in possession of the notes in question from the
time of the death of her mother until she delivered them to her
attorneys was to furnish proof that the claimant had possession of
the notes prior to the death of her mother. If the claimant's counsel
had asked her upon the trial whether or not she had possession of
the notes prior to the death of her mother, such question would
have been objectionable. . . .What cannot be allowed by direct
question cannot be allowed through a skillfully formed indirect
interrogatory. 28
Similarly, in Romines v. Illinois Motor Freight,29 the defendant-truck
driver in a wrongful death action attempted to testify that the day after the
accident he went to the scene of the accident and observed marks on the
pavement. The court held that although the defendant could observe the
physical facts after the death of the decedent, his testimony was properly
excluded since the marks were made at the time of the accident and prior
to the death of the decedent.
The disqualification of a witness is only removed to the extent provided
by the exception, that is, as to facts which occur after the death of the
24 Crimp v. First Trust and Say. Bank, 352 Ill. 93, 185 N.E. 179 (1933), affirming 263
Ill. App. 499 (1st Dist. 1931); Vigus v. O'Bannon, 118 Ill. 334, 8 N.E. 778 (1886).
25 Swirski v. Darlington, 369 Ill. 188, 15 N.E.2d 856 (1938). Plaintiff in a will contest
was held competent to testify that the attorney of the deceased showed him a different
will than the will admitted to probate, and also to conversations with the attorney, all of
the facts occurring after the death of the deceased. See also Schmidt v. Schmidt, 311 Ill.
458, 142 N.E. 75 (1924); Wood v. Tyler, 256 Ill. App. 401 (1st Dist. 1930); Parrish v. Vancil,
132 111. App. 495 (2d 1908).
26 In re Estate of Stahl, 305 Ill. App. 517, 27 N.E.2d 662 (1st Dist. 1940); Halladay v.
Blair, 223 Ill. App. 609 (2d Dist. 1921).
27 223 Ill. App. 609 (2d Dist. 1921).
28 Id. at 612.
29 21 Ill. App. 2d 380, 158 N.E.2d 97 (2d Dist 1959).
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decedent. The fact that he is on the witness stand does not open the door
to allow him to testify generally for the opposing party.30
When the protected party sues or defends as the guardian or trustee of
any heir, legatee, or devisee, an additional statutory requirement must be
met before the disqualification of a party or interested person is removed
by the first exception. Although there has been no case construing this pro-
vision, dictum in Stone v. Cook8l indicates the interpretation which will
be placed on the provision. In Stone the court said:
... . [I]f the adverse party sues or defends as guardian or trustee
for such heir, legatee or devisee, then the additional restriction is
imposed, that such fact shall have occurred not only subsequently
to the death of the deceased, but also after such heir, legatee or
devisee shall have attained his or her majority.8 2
CONVERSATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS TESTIFIED TO BY AN AGENT OF THE
DECEDENT ON BEHALF OF THE PROTECTED PARTY
The second enumerated exception to the Dead Man's Act provides:
When, in such action, suit or proceeding, any agent of any de-
ceased person shall, in behalf of any person or persons suing or
being sued, in either of the capacities above named, testify to any
conversation or transaction between such agent and the opposite
party or party in interest, such opposite party or party in interest
may testify concerning the same conversation or transaction. 38
When an agent of a deceased person testifies for the protected party to
a conversation or transaction between himself and a disqualified witness
such disqualified witness is permitted to testify to the same conversation or
transaction for the opposing party.
34
In order to render a disqualified witness competent to testify for the op-
posing party under this exception, the witness who testifies for the protected
party must have been an agent of the deceased.8 5 Although the courts have
never specifically held so, it is obvious that who is an agent is determined by
the law of agency. The Restatement of Agency defines agency as: ". . . [T]he
fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one
person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his
control, and consent by the other party to act," and it goes on to define agent,
"[T]he one who is to act is the agent."36 The courts have held that when the
witness who has testified for the protected party was a scrivener to draw an
30 In re Estate of Law, 214 Ill. App. 8 (1st Dist. 1920).
31 79 Ill. 424 (1875).
32 Id. at 428.
3 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 2, par. 2d (1967).
34 Frike v. McClure, 389 Ill. 543, 60 N.E.2d (1945); Marshall v. Karl, 60 Ill. 206 (1871);
Jocquin v. Davidson, 49 111. 82 (1868).
s Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51 § 2, par. 2d (1967).
36 Restatement (Second), Agency § 1 (1958).
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instrument,37 or where the witness was the housekeeper of the deceased,3 8
or the custodian of documents of the deceased, 39 that the witness was not an
agent of the deceased and the statutory disqualification of the opposing
party was not removed.
The agent of the deceased person must be called as a witness by the
protected party in order to remove the disqualification of the Act. The op-
posing party cannot render a disqualified witness competent to testify in
his behalf by calling an agent of the deceased. The calling of the agent must
be on the behalf of the protected party.40
This exception applies only to "conversations" or "transactions." The
courts have never attempted to define precisely what is meant by either of
these terms. It seems unlikely that the court will be called upon to define
what constitutes a "conversation." Webster's Dictionary defines "conversa-
tion" as "social interchange." 41 Although the courts have never precisely
defined what constitutes a "transaction," it is evident that the courts have
construed it in a broad sense. Thus, the courts have permitted a disqualified
witness to testify to the facts and circumstances out of which the considera-
tion for a note arose,42 and they have allowed a disqualified witness to give
his version of an automobile accident.43 However, in Symonds v. Caldwell,44
an action for distress for rent, in which the agent of the deceased testified
to conversations and transactions between himself and the defendant-tenant,
but also gave his opinion as to the value of the crops remaining on the
leased land, the defendant-tenant attempted to testify as to the value of the
crops. The court held that the opinion as to value was not a conversation
or transaction and the defendant's testimony was properly excluded at the
trial.
The fact that the agent of the deceased was called as a witness by the
protected party does not render the otherwise disqualified witness competent
to testify generally for the opposing party. The otherwise disqualified wit-
ness may only testify to the same conversations or transactions which the
agent of the deceased testified to for the protected party.45 Also, the opposing
party under the Dead Man's Act cannot render an otherwise disqualified
witness competent to testify by cross-examining the agent of the deceased
as to conversations or transactions which were not gone into upon his
37 Spencer v. Boardman, 118 Ill. 553, 9 N.E. 330 (1886).
38 Kramer v. Hakel, 240 Ill. App. 40 (2d Dist. 1926).
39 Comer v. Comer, 24 Ill. App. 526 (3d Dist. 1886), affirmed 120 111. 420, 11 N.E. 848
(1887).
40 Elwell v. Hicks, 238 Il. 170, 87 N.E. 316 (1909); Loeb v. Stem, 198 Il1. 372, 64 N.E.
1044 (1902).
41 Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary (1964).
42 Marshall v. Karl, supra note 34.
43 Beeke v. Workman, 336 Ill. App. 1, 82 N.E.2d 701 (2d Dist. 1948).
44 112 Ill. App. 341 (1st Dist. 1904).
45 Symonds v. Caldwell, 112 11. App. 341 (lst Dist 1904).
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direct examination. Thus, in Loeb v. Stern,46 the attorney for the opposing
party elicited testimony that was not part of the agent's direct examination.
The opposing party (disqualified witness) then sought to testify himself as
to the transaction brought out by his attorney. The court held that the
incompetency of the disqualified witness was not removed, since the transac-
tion that was elicited on cross-examination was not testimony on behalf of
the protected party.
When the agent of a deceased person testifies to a conversation or
transaction between his principal and a disqualified person, the disqualified
witness is not rendered competent to testify for the opposing party to the
conversation or transaction. The second exception applies only to conversa-
tions and transactions between the agent of the deceased party and the
adverse party, not to conversations and transactions between the adverse
party and the deceased principal. 47
CONVERSATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS TESTIFIED TO BY THE PROTECTED PARTY
OR PARTY IN INTEREST
The third separate exception to the Dead Man's Act provides:
Where, in any such action, suit or proceeding, any such party suing
or defending, as aforesaid, or any person having a direct interest in
the event of such action, suit or proceeding, shall testify in behalf
of such party so suing or defending, to any conversation or trans-
action with the opposite party or party in interest, then such op-
posite party or party in interest shall also be permitted to testify
to the same conversation or transaction.48
A disqualified witness under the Dead Man's Act is rendered competent
to testify to any conversation or transaction to which a protected party or
person having a direct interest in the result of the suit has testified. When
the otherwise incompetent witness attempts to testify by this exception, in
order to remove the disqualification it must be shown that either the pro-
tected party or a person having a direct interest in the result of the suit has
testified to the conversation or transaction to which the incompetent witness
is going to testify.
The statute enumerates the capacities in which a party suing or
defending is a protected party. A party is protected if he is a trustee or
conservator of any habitual drunkard, or a person who is mentally ill or
mentally deficient, or he sues or defends as the executor, administrator,
heir, legatee or devisee of any deceased person, or as guardian or trustee of
46 198 Ill. 372, 64 N.E. 1044 (1902).
47 First Nat'l Bank of Monmouth, 118 Ill. 625, 9 N.E. 196 (1888); Whisman v. Small,
188 Ill. App. 61 (3d Dist. 1914); Moore v. Botto, 159 Ill. App. 322 (Ist Dist. 1911); Maher v.
Title Guar. and Trust Co., 95 Il. App. 365 (1st Dist. 1900).
48 1I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 2, par. Sd (1967).
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any such heir, legatee or devisee.49 The statute, however, does not define or
enumerate who is a person having a direct interest in the suit. In construing
"direct interest" the court in Butz v. Schwartz, said:
At the time of enactment of this exception, the words "person hav-
ing a direct interest in the event of such action, suit or proceeding,"
had a well known meaning .... The rule was, where the event of
the suit, if adverse to the party adducing the witness, would render
the latter liable either to a third party or to the party himself,
there was a direct interest on the part of the witness .... 50
Under this definition, persons who have been held to have a "direct
interest" are those who would receive the direct, certain and immediate
benefits of a wrongful death action. 51 Likewise, an agent who would be
liable over if the action was adverse to the decedent 52 was found to be in-
terested. Although a person who testifies for a protected party may have
the outward appearance of being a person with a direct interest because of
the relationship to the protected party or to the person for whom the suit is
brought, the disqualified witness will not be rendered competent unless the
person does in fact have a direct interest in the suit. Thus, in Citizens Nat'l
Bank of Decatur v. Doran,53 a personal injury action in which the wife of
an incompetent plaintiff testified in his behalf, the court held that the in-
competency of the disqualified witness was not removed. The court held
that the fact that the wife might suffer a possible loss of support was not a
legal interest which was direct, certain or immediate so that she would gain
or lose as a result of the suit. Since she was not an interested person, the
disqualification of incompetent witnesses was not removed.
The removal of the disqualification of the otherwise incompetent wit-
ness is not a complete removal of the incompetency; it is only removed to
those conversations and transactions testified to by the protected party or
person directly interested. 54 When the otherwise incompetent witness is
rendered competent under this exception he may testify to the same con-
versation or transaction, for example, by rebutting the testimony or by ex-
plaining the testimony or by calling out the whole of the conversation or
transaction.5 5 Thus, if the protected party has only produced testimony to
49 See discussion of "protected parties" at page 49 of this symposium.
5O 135 111. 180, 188-189, 25 N.E .1007, 1008-1009 (1890).
51 VanMeter v. Goldfarb, 317 Ill. 620, 148 N.E. 391 (1925), affirming 236 Ill. App. 126
(1st Dist. 1925) (the brother of the decedent testified as an occurrance witness); Rouse v.
Tomasek, 279 Ill. App. 557 (1st Dist. 1935) (the husband of the decedent, in a wrongful
death action, testified to her normal careful habits).
52 Butz v. Schwartz, supra note 50.
53 Citizens Nat'l Bank of Decatur v. Doran, 3 Ill. App. 2d 383, 122 N.E.2d 450 (3d
Dist. 1954). See also Greenwood v. Commercial Nat'l Bank of Peoria, 7 Ill. 2d 436, 130
N.E.2d 753 (1955).
54 Newman v. Youngblood, 349 Ill. 617, 69 N.E.2d 309 (1946); Roche v. Roche, 286
111. 336, 121 N.E. 621 (1919); Vail v. Rynearson, 249 Ill. 501, 94 N.E. 942 (1911); Blanchard
v. Blanchard, 191 Ill. 450, 61 N.E. 481 (1901).
55 VanMeter v. Goldfarb, supra note 51; Allen v. McGill, 311 Ill. 170, 142 N.E. 480
(1924); Blanchard v. Blanchard, supra note 54.
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a part of the conversation or transaction, the disqualified witness may
testify to the whole of the conversation or transaction, including those parts
which the protected party did not elicit. The disqualified witness, however,
is not rendered competent to testify generally for the opposing party.56
The third exception covers "any conversation" testified to by the
protected party or person directly interested. Thus, the courts have per-
mitted the disqualified witness to testify after the disqualificaion has been
removed under this exception to conversations with the protected party or
the person directly interested, whether or not the decedent was present,5 7
and also to conversations with the decedent. 58
The courts have been liberal in construing "transactions." 59 It has been
held that the concept of a "transaction" permits the otherwise disqualified
witness to testify, after the disqualification is removed, to the facts surround-
ing the delivery of a deed,60 or to the facts, as he interprets them, surround-
ing an automobile accident,61 or to the facts surrounding the giving of com-
mercial paper.62 The liberal construction of "transactions" is best illustrated
in Rouse v. Tomasek, 63 a wrongful death suit arising out of an automobile
accident. In Rouse the husband of the decedent testified to her normal
careful habits in crossing streets. The court held that his testimony opened
the door for the opposing party to testify as to what occurred at the time of
the accident.
When, however, a witness for a protected party merely testified to the
earnings of the deceased, the disqualified witness was not rendered com-
petent to testify as to the circumstances surrounding the accident upon
which the suit was brought. 64 Likewise, the disqualified witness was not
competent to testify to the circumstances surrounding an ante-nuptial agree-
ment between herself and her deceased husband when the husband's heirs
merely testified to the signatures on the ante-nuptial agreement. 65
CONVERSATIONS AND ADMISSIONS TESTIFIED TO BY A DISINTERESTED
WITNESS OCCURRING BEFORE THE DEATH AND IN THE ABSENCE OF
THE DECEDENT
The fourth enumerated exception to the Dead Man's Act provides:
Where, in any such action, suit or proceeding, any witness, not a
party to the record, or not a party in interest, or not an agent of
56 Mann v. Mann, 270 IlL. 83, 110 N.E. 345 (1915); Calkins v. Calkins, 220 Ill. 111, 77
N.E. 102 (1906); Pennington v. Rowley Bros. Co., 241 I1. App. 58 (1st Dist. 1926).
57 Ogden v. Keck, 253 Il. App. 444 (4th Dist. 1929).
58 Johnson v. Lane, 369 Ill. 135, 15 N.E.2d 710 (1935); Maule v. Maule, 312 Il. 129,
143 N.E. 422 (1924); Plain v. Roth, 107 Ill. 588 (1882).
59 VanMeter v. Goldfarb, 317 Ill. 620, 148 N.E. 391 (1925).
60 Newman v. Youngblood, 394 IL. 617, 69 N.E.2d 309 (1946).
61 Supra note 59.
62 Butz V. Schwartz, 135 Ill. 180, 25 N.E. 1007 (1890).
63 Rouse v. Tomasek, 279 11. 557 (1st Dist. 1935).
64 Pennington v. Rowley Bros. Co., 241 Ill. App. 58 (1st Dist. 1926).
65 Mann v. Mann, 270 11. 83, 110 N.E. 345 (1915).
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such deceased person, shall, in behalf of any party to such action,
suit or proceeding, testify to any conversation or admission by any
adverse party or party in interest, occurring before the death and in
the absence of such deceased person, such adverge party or party in
interest may also testify as to the same admission or conversation. 66
The fourth exception to the Dead Man's Act, like the second and the
third, removes the disqualification of an otherwise incompetent person only
when the protected party has first called a witness who testifies to matters
covered by the exception. The witness upon whom the disqualified witness
relies to render him competent, must have been called by the protected
party.67
If, however, the protected party cross-examines a witness of the opposing
party beyond the scope of the direct examination, and the examination
touches upon matters that are covered by the exception, the witness will be
said to have been a witness of the protected party and the incompetency of
the disqualified witness will be removed to the extent provided by the
exception. 68 Thus, in Stevens v. Brown,69 the protected party, while cross-
examining a witness of the opposing party, elicited testimony concerning
conversations which the opposing party neither brought out nor laid the
foundation for in his direct examination of his witness. The court held
that the protected party cannot misuse his right of cross-examination and
elicit testimony which exceeds the bounds of the direct examination and
then seek to prevent the opposing party from giving his version of the
testimony by claiming that it was the opposing party's witness who testified
in the first instance. Similarly, if the witness of the disqualified party volun-
teers information when on the stand and the protected party cross-examines
the witness as to the volunteered matter, the disqualification of the otherwise
incompetent witness is removed, and he may rebut the testimony of his
witness.7 o
To remove the incompetency of a disqualified witness under this ex-
ception the protected party's witness under whom the disqualified witness
seeks to introduce testimony must have been a "witness," as defined by the
exception. A witness for the protected party who will qualify the otherwise
disqualified person must be someone who is neither a party, nor a party in
interest, nor an agent of the deceased. If the protected party's witness under
whom the disqualified witness seeks to testify is an agent, or a party, or a
party in interest, the disqualification is not removed by the fourth excep-
tion.71
Although the witness called by the protected party is a witness as
defined by the fourth exception, this alone will not remove the incompetency
66 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 51 § 2, par. 4th (1967).
67 Richardson v. Sternburg, 65 Ill. 273 (1872).
68 Stevens v. Brown, 12 111. App. 619 (lst Dist. 1883).
69 Ibid.
70 Kitz v. Scudder Syrup Co., 199 Ill. App. 605 (1st Dist. 1916).
71 Gardner v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 226 F.2d 109 (7th Cir. 1955);
Darling v. Wood, 168 Ill. App. 272 (2d Dist. 1912).
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of a disqualified person. To remove the disqualification the testimony of the
protected party's witness must be to the matters enumerated in the excep-
tion. The witness must testify to a "conversation" or "admission" made by
the disqualified person which occurred prior to the death of the decedent
and out of the presence of the decedent.7 2 This exception does not apply
to testimony as to "transactions."7 3
If the conversation or admission occurred while the deceased was
present,7 4 or was a conversation or admission made to the deceased, 75 the
incompetency of the disqualified person is not removed by this exception.
Thus, to qualify a witness under this exception four requirements must be
met: (1) the witness under whom the disqualified witness seeks to testify
must not be a party or party in interest or agent of the deceased; (2) the
protected party's witness must have testified to a conversation or admission
made by the adverse party or party in interest; (3) the conversation or ad-
mission must have occurred prior to the death of the deceased; (4) the con-
versation or admission must have been made outside the presence of the
deceased.
The courts have never, in reference to the Dead Man's Act, defined what
is an admission. An admission is defined in Corpus Juris Secundum as:
"Any statement, whether oral or written, made by or attributable to a party
to an action, which tends to establish or disprove any material fact in a
case...."76 In Pink v. Dempsey,7 7 an action on an oral contract to make a
will, a witness for the protected party testified that the claimant had made
long trips during the time that she alleged she was in the continuous ser-
vices of the deceased. The court held that this was not an admission which
would entitle the disqualified witness to testify. The court said that to hold
such testimony to be an "admission" would be a strained construction of the
word.
Once a disqualified person is rendered competent to testify, he may
rebut, deny or explain any conversation or admission attributed to him by
the witness for the protected party.
7 8
RELEVANT AND COMPETENT MATTERS IN THE DEPOSITION OF DECEASED
INTRODUCED BY THE PROTECTED PARTY
The fifth separate exception to the Dead Man's Act provides:
When, in any such action, suit or proceeding, the deposition of
such deceased person shall be read in evidence at the trial, any
72 Bundy v. White, 297 II. 238, 130 N.E. 709 (1921); Pink v. Dempsey, 350 Il1. App.
405, 113 N.E.2d 339 (1st Dist. 1953).
73 Pink v. Dempsey, supra note 72.
74 Volbracht v. White, 197 111. 298, 64 N.E. 324 (1902).
75 Ruchman v. Alwood, 71 111. 155 (1873).
76 31A C.J.S., Evidence § 272(a).
77 Supra note 72.
78 Judy v. Judy, 261 111. 470, 104 N.E. 256 (1914); Jones v. Gilbert, 135 Ili. 27, 25 N.E.
566 (1890); Crow v. Blaser, 335 Il. App. 281, 81 N.E.2d 472 (2d Dist. 1948); Robnett v.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
adverse party or party in interest may testify as to all matters and
things testified to in such deposition by such deceased person, and
not excluded for irrelevancy or incompetency.7 9
When the deposition of the deceased person is read into evidence, the
disqualified person is rendered competent to testify to all matters and things
which were not excluded from the deposition because of irrelevancy or
incompetence.80
The testimony of a now deceased person given in a former trial,8l and
the testimony of a party who has died pending the litigation,82 have been
likened to a deposition, so that the introduction of such testimony removes
the incompetency of the otherwise disqualified witness. However, in Groin-
mes v. St. Paul Transit Co.,83 the court held that the reading of a prior
judgment was not evidence of the facts upon which the judgment was
founded, but merely that the judgment existed. The judgment was there-
fore not likened to a deposition so that the disqualified person was rendered
competent.8 4
When the disqualified person is rendered competent, he may rebut,
deny or explain what was brought out in the deposition of the deceased.8 5
The exception provides that the disqualified person may testify to "all
matters and things" brought out in the deposition of the deceased. This
provision is construed liberally by the courts.86 In Turner v. Lee,8 7 for
example, the deposition of the deceased was introduced by the protected
party. The deposition primarily covered the conversations at the time the
deed was executed but it also touched upon other conversations relating to
the consideration for the deed. The disqualified person was held competent
to testify to all conversations with the deceased concerning the consideration
as being "matters and things" touched upon by the deceased in her deposi-
tion; the disqualified person was not limited to the conversation on the
day the deed was executed.
As with the second, third and fourth exceptions to the Dead Man's Act,
under the fifth exception the opposing party cannot render disqualified per-
sons competent by his acts. To remove the bar of the Act the deposition of
79 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch., 51 § 2, par. 5th (1967).
80 DeCosta v. Bischer, 287 I1. 598, 122 N.E. 819 (1919); Turner v. Lee, 254 Ill. 141,
98 N.E. 246 (1912); Tanner v. Clapp, 139 I11. App. 353 (2d Dist. 1908).
81 Chicago Trust Co. v. Lumber Co., 242 Il1. 468, 90 N.E. 282 (1909); Vancuren v.
Vancuren, 348 Ill. App. 351, 109 N.E.2d 225 (3d Dist. 1952); Tanner v. Clapp, supra note
80.
82 Turner v. Black, 19 Ill. 2d 296, 166 N.E.2d 588 (1960); Turner v. Lee, supra note 80.
83 147 Ill. 634, 35 N.E. 820 (1893).
84 Ibid.
85 Turner v. Lee, supra note 80; Eastman v. United Marble Co., 224 Ill. App. 256 (lst
Dist. 1922).
86 Turner v. Lee, supra note 80.
87 Ibid.
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the decedent under which the disqualified person seeks to testify must have
been introduced by the protected party. The disqualified party cannot
qualify himself or others by introducing the deposition of the decedent.88
JERRY C. LAGERQUIST
88 Doggett v. Greene, 254 Il1. 134, 98 N.E. 219 (1912).
